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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

Case No. 20616

DEREK ANDREASONf

j

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:
POINT I

THERE WAS AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
THE JOINT REPRESENTATION OF THE APPELLANT
AND THE CO-DEFENDANT.
Point II of appellant's brief raises the issue of the
denial of appellant's constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel.

This was due to the existence of a conflict of

interest between appellant and the co-defendant because they were
both represented at trial by the same attorney.

This issue turns

on the question of the existence of an actual conflict of interest.
However, a factor in determining how a reviewing court may assess
the question of an actual conflict of

interest

is the trial

court's failure to make any inquiry into the conflict issue with
counsel or

the defendants
In its

brief,

due

to

respondent

this
cites

joint

representation.

federal

cases

that

describe general situations involving actual conflicts of interest.
One of those cases, United States v. Benavidez, 664 F.2d
(5th Cir. 1982), provides:
All of our previous cases granting relief
on grounds of actual conflict have involved
one or more of the following situations:
(1) the conflict was brought to the trial
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1255

court's attention at the outset of the
trial or at the time when the conflict
first became apparent; (2) one defendant
has evidence that would have exculpated
himself but inculpated a co-defendant; (3)
the prosecution's evidence offered defendant
a theory under which he could prove his own
innocence by proving his co-defendant's
guilt. 664 F.2d at 1259.
In United States v. Alvarez, 696 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir.
1983), the court noted that in the absence of an inquiry made
pursuant to Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1,
a reviewing court will be more likely to assume that there was an
actual conflict of interest.
Applying the Benavidez standard to this case, the first
situation is inapplicable because the possibility of a conflict
of interest was never brought to the trial court's attention.
The second situation, where one defendant had evidence that would
have exculpated himself but inculpated a co-defendant, did, in
fact, exist here. The statements made by Ray Andreason, the codefendant and appellant's father, on cross examination fit within
1.

Rule 44(c) provides:
Joint Representation. Whenever two or more
defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for
trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the same retained or assigned
counsel or by retained or assigned counsel
who are associated in the practice of law,
the court shall promptly inquire with
respect to such joint representation and
shall personally advise each defendant of
his right to the effective assistance of
counsel, including separate representation.
Unless it appears that there is good cause
to believe no conflict of interest is likely
to arise, the court shall take such measures
as may be appropriate to protect each
defendant's right to counsel.
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this catagory.2

jn

that

testimony,

Ray

Andreason

indicated

that, after learning of the improper electrical hookup, his first
reaction was to call the appellant and place the blame on him for
the offense.

(Tr. 481-488).

Thus, under this test, there was an

actual conflict of interest.
The third

situation

applicable to this case.

described

in Benavidez

is also

The prosecution's evidence did offer

appellant a theory under which he could prove his own innocence
by proving the co-defendant's guilt.
in this

case

showed

that there

The prosecution's evidence

were two

improper electrical

hookups at appellant's business property (Tr. 90-92, 226). The
co-defendant's seal, which he used in his employment with Utah
Power and Light, had been used on at least one of these hookups
(Tr. 74-75).

The State's evidence also showed that the appellant

would have been the beneficiary of the improper hookup (Tr. 79),
and the value of the electrical power received was more than one
thousand dollars (Tr. 280). A reasonable theory for appellant's
defense would be that the co-defendant made the improper hookup
without appellant's knowledge.

The evidence did establish that

the appellant had his power turned off
failure to make

his payments

in the past due to a

(Tr. 426, 437, 454).

The co-

defendant, appellant's father and an employee of Utah Power and
Light Company, could have made these hookups to help his son
financially, or to save the embarrassment of his son having his
power turned off.
2. This portion of Ray Andreason's testimony is set out in full
in appellant's brief at page 16-17.
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The fact that appellant did not raise such a defense only reinforces the existence of an actual conflict.
court inquiring

Without the trial

into the potential conflicts and obtaining an

express waiver of such a conflict, it cannot be assumed that
appellant was aware that such a defense existed, nor can it be
assumed that appellant knowingly waived raising such a defense.
Since there is an actual conflict of interest in counsel representing both the appellant and the co-defendant, appellant was
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Prejudice must then be presumed, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475 (1978), his conviction

reversed

and a new trial ordered.

CONCLUSION
There was an actual conflict of interest between the
co-defendants in this case. Their joint representation by a single
attorney resulted

in the denial of appellant's

constitutional

right to the effective assistance of counsel. Consequently, this
court must reverse the appellant's conviction and order a new
trial.

The failure of the trial court to inquire into the poten-

tial for a conflict of interest contributed to the problem here,
because this court cannot assume that the appellant was aware of
any conflict of interest or that he waived it without such an
inquiry by the trial court.

In this case, this court should

adopt a rule similar to Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requiring
potential for

trial

conflicts

of

courts

to make

interest

inquiries

in cases

into the

involving

joint

representation and further advise defendants of their right to
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individual counsel or take other action as the situation dictates.
Dated this

day of April, 1986,

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant were mailed/delivered to
the Attorney General's Office, at 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this

day of April, 1986.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

